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4ABSTRACT
Delays in project implementation and the attendant cost overruns
have been a regular feature in the electric power sector in Kerala. Almost
all the public projects, including the prestigious major hydroelectric
project of Idukki, have been the unfortunate victims of time and cost
overruns on account of a number of avoidable factors, labour disputes
being singled out as the prime villain. In this paper we take up a detailed
analysis of the cost of inefficiency involved in the time and cost overruns
in the power projects of the KSEB, and their possible causes. We find
that the arguments by the government in favour of private sector
participation in power generating capacity addition, under the pretext of
a severe resources crunch, is flimsy to the extent that the government is
actually over-spending on each of the projects undertaken. We find that
the real problem arises not out of a shrinking coffer but out of the
inefficiency of management coupled with the political economy of vicious
rent seeking.
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5“Quite obviously it came up through the waste,
Rejects through ignorance or apathy
That passage back. The problem must be faced;
And life go on…..”
- Roy Fuller (“The Image”)
1.  Introduction
This paper on time and cost overruns of the power sector projects
in Kerala is a part of a larger study on ‘The Plight of the Power Sector in
India: Inefficiency, Reforms and Political Economy’, and discusses the
costs of inefficiency in the particular context of the Kerala power sector
at the project implementation stage. In an earlier paper (Kannan and
Pillai 2001 a) we have discussed the cost of inefficiency involved in
general in the Indian power sector at the various stages of operation.
Here we take up an analysis of the cost of inefficiency involved in time
and cost overruns in the power projects in Kerala. This is of very
significance in the present context of arguments by the government in
favour of private sector participation in power generating capacity
addition, under the pretext of a resources crunch. The government is
said to be under a tight constraint of severe funds scarcity and hence
incapable of undertaking new projects for power development. However,
we will find that this argument is flimsy to the extent that the government
is actually over-spending on each of the projects undertaken. Each project
involves immense cost overrun. Had the government been able to
6implement each project efficiently within the normally expected
constraints of time and cost, then it could have saved huge resources and
hence undertaken a large number of additional projects. It is not that the
government has no resources meant for power development, because it
is actually over-spending; the problem is in the inefficiency of
management, coupled with the political economy of corruption. The
present paper, in six sections, has the limited objective of bringing into
light this aspect. Following this introduction, section 2 provides a brief
discussion of the individual projects, falling under the time and cost
overruns and the third section, their comparative analysis. The costs of
delays are examined in section 4, and the possible causes in section 5.
The last part briefly discusses the political economy of corruption
involved in the time and cost overruns of the power projects in Kerala,
and concludes the study.
Delays in project implementation and the attendant cost escalation
have been a regular feature in the electric power sector in Kerala.
Normally the construction of a major hydro-power plant is expected to
be completed within 8 – 10 years and that of a mini hydel project in 2 –
3 years. However, the Kerala experience baffles all the common senses
in this respect, with longer time and higher cost over-runs in the case of
both major and mini hydel projects. A ‘classic’ example is the Kakkad
hydro-electric project of 50 mega watt (mw) installed capacity; the project
was sanctioned as long back as in 1976 with an original cost estimate of
Rs. 1860 lakhs; this project was proudly presented that time as the least
cost hydro-electric project in the State! It was scheduled to be
commissioned in 1986; but it took 23 years for the Kerala power system
to tap the energy potential of this project (major construction works on it
started only in 1979), at an estimated cost of Rs. 153.5 crores, about 725
per cent above the original one!
7The Kakkad story is not an isolated exception, but forms only a
part of an unending serial of over-runs in Kerala power system. The
prestigious major project of Idukki also was an unfortunate victim of
time and cost over-run, mainly due to labour disputes, the prime villain
in every instance. Idukki Stage I project (3 units of 390 MW) could not
be commissioned in the Fourth Five Year Plan (1969-74) as scheduled
and had a long gestation period due to labour problems, until it was
finally commissioned in 1976. When idukki Stage II project (3 units of
390 MW) was put on line in 1986, after a time over-run of about 8 years,
it had a cost escalation of 115 per cent over the original estimate.
Similarly, the next project, Idamalayar (of 75 MW, started way
back in 1970 and commissioned in 1987), suffered a time over-run of
about 9 years and a cost increase of 285 per cent. Two major firm power
augmentation schemes, Sabarigiri Augmentation and Idukki Stage III,
too had the same fate. Started in 1972 and 1975 respectively, the works
on these projects could not be completed till the turn of the 90s. A cost
over-run of nearly 780 per cent (the highest ever among the projects in
the Kerala system!) and a time over-run of 10 years go to the discredit of
Sabarigiri Augmentation scheme, beyond any common sense accounts.
And a cost increase of about 270 per cent with a time over-run of about
10 years lie behind the Idukki Stage III project.
2.   Project-wise Analysis
Data on  time and cost overruns of 16 other hydro-power projects
are available for analysis, the data having been collected from the various
volumes of Economic Review of Kerala State since 1985. These projects
are 1) Kakkad, 2) Kallada, 3) Lower Periyar, 4) Pooyankutty,
5)  Malampuzha, 6) Madupetty, 7) Malankara, 8) Chimony, 9) Peppara,
10) Azhutha Diversion, 11) Kuttiar Diversion, 12) Poringalkuthu Left
Bank Extension, 13) Vadakkeppuzha Diversion, 14) Vazhikkadavu
8Diversion, 15) Kuttyadi Tail Race and 16) Kuttiady Extension. The details
of these projects are given in Table 1 (and also in the Appendix).
1. Kakkad
This project, considered the least cost hydro-electric project in
Kerala, is to use the tail race waters of Sabarigiri power house (PH),
together with the inflow of two tributaries of Kakkad river, viz.,
Moozhiyar and Veluthodu streams over a gross head of 132.6 m. for
power generation of 262 million units (mu) with an installed capacity of
50 mw.
Though the project was sanctioned by the Planning Commission
way back in 1976 at an estimated cost of Rs. 1860 lakhs, the construction
activities were started only by 1978-79 due to paucity of funds. Even
after the work was started, the progress was tardy. For one example, the
total length of the inter-connecting tunnel driven as by the close of
1986-87 was only 886 meters (out of 3036 meters).  The poor performance
was mainly due to labour disputes for over a year from 3-10-1985 to
29-10-1986. Though the work was resumed on 30-10-1986, it was
interrupted on 6-2-1987 due to a rock fall inside the tunnel.  In the case
of the power tunnel, some progress was achieved only in 1986-87; two
earlier contracts with poor performance had to be terminated here.
The time and cost overrun story of this project has already been
mentioned.  Over a period of 23 years, with a time overrun of about 13
years as in 1999, when it was finally commissioned, the cost escalation
of this project was 725 per cent above the original estimate. That is, the
actual cost was more than 8 times the original cost estimate. It should be
noted that a project is sanctioned at the costs that exist at the time when
the project is submitted. The cost estimate is likely to increase over time
on account of price inflation. Though the original cost estimate is
9presumed to include an allowance for possible price inflation, often the
actual experience can deviate from the assumptions. Hence it is natural
to consider and identify that part of the cost escalation that is due to
price inflation which can by no means be attributed to improper project
formulation and/or implementation. However, what remains in the cost
overrun over and above the effect of price increase is a matter of concern
demanding explanations in terms of real factors involved in faulty
planning and execution. For each of the projects, we have estimated the
price inflation in terms of WPI for all commodities experienced during
the project implementation period, in order to differentiate the effects of
price inflation and of other factors on capital expenditure.
The WPI for all commodities registered as in 1999 an increase of
only 461.2 per cent over 1976 (when the Kakkad project was sanctioned).
This implies that the cost escalation is about 1.5 times the general price
inflation (as given by the WPI for all commodities). Thus it is clear that
price inflation alone is not responsible for cost overrun; about 260 per
cent of the increase in the cost estimate can be attributed to factors other
than price inflation, which can evidently be treated as a waste of resources.
2. Kallada
This project envisages construction of a dam toe power station of
15 MW installed capacity and generation of 53 MU of power from the
existing Kallada irrigation project. Though the contracts for civil works
were settled in April 1985, and works began immediately, frequent
releases of water through the irrigation outlets of the dam flooded the
work areas, preventing the progress of works.
The project was sanctioned in 1981 with an original cost estimate
of Rs. 1180 lakhs and was commissioned in 1993-94 at a (revised) cost
of Rs. 1802 lakhs, representing 52.71 per cent increase. It was to be
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commissioned at the earliest by 1989, but had to undergo a time overrun
of 5 years. During the same period, the WPI (all commodities) rose by
148 per cent; and the revised cost estimate of this project appears not to
have been inflated to that extent.
3.  Lower Periyar
This is a tail race cum run-off-river scheme in the lower reaches
of Periyar river downstream of Neriamangalam power house. The scheme
envisages the utilisation of the waters of Neriamangalam power station,
the spill from the Kallarkutty dam and the available yield from the
Perinjankutty  catchment and the catchment areas below the dams at
Kallarkutty, Idukki and Cheruthoni river, over an average gross head of
302.63 m. for power generation, with an installed capacity of 180 MW
and annual generation of 493 MU.
Started in 1983 with an original estimate of Rs. 8843 lakhs, this
project was commissioned in 1997 and its revised cost estimate as in
1999-2000 stood at Rs. 353 crores. Over these 14 years (including a
time overrun of 6 years), the cost estimate saw an increase of about 300
per cent against an increase in the WPI (all commodities) by 194 per
cent. Thus after accounting for the full impact of  price inflation on the
capital cost of the project, about 111 per cent increase needs to be
explained by other factors of wasteful management.
4. Pooyankutty
The scheme envisages construction of a 148 m. high concrete dam
across river Pooyankutty and a surface power station with two units of
120 MW each; thus with an installed capacity of 240 MW and annual
generation of 645 MU. The scheme was approved by the Planning
Commission as far back as in August 1986. However, the central
government’s sanction of forest clearance is still to be received. The
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state government and the KSEB are reported to have fulfilled all the
formalities for the issuance of sanction, including the proposals for
compensatory afforestation as required under the Forest Conservation
Act of 1980. So far only minor preliminary works have been done.
A 14 years incubation for a project proposal is ample evidence of
the lethargy and non-commitment on the part of the planners. During
this period, the cost estimate was revised upward by 228 per cent, from
Rs. 250 crores to Rs. 820 crores, far exceeding (by 45 per cent) the
general price inflation (182.7 per cent) during this period.
5.  Malampuzha
A mini hydel project of 2.5 MW with an annual generation of 5.6
MU, this scheme envisages construction of a power station on the
downstream side of the existing irrigation dam (owned by the State PWD)
to utilise the irrigation release. Started in 1987 and expected to be on-
line by 1989, this mini project is now expected to be commissioned ‘in
the near future’. After 12 years with a time overrun of about 10  years as
in 1999-2000, the capital cost was revised from the original Rs. 295
lakhs to Rs. 679 lakhs – an increase of about 130 per cent. Over the
same period the WPI (all commodities) registered an increase of 169 per
cent.
6. Madupetty
Another mini hydel project of 2 MW with 6.4 MU of annual
generation, this scheme aims at construction of a dam toe power house
at the existing Madupetty dam for power generation using the water
released from the Pallivasal hydro-electric project. Started in 1987 and
expected to yield its energy by 1989, this mini project was at long last
fully commissioned by January 1998 after a time overrun of about 9
years. The cost estimate was revised from the original Rs. 292 lakhs to
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Rs. 775 lakhs by 1995, which, however, came down to Rs. 478 lakhs by
1998, providing a good example for the reliability of estimation procedure
of the KSEB; in the case of most of the projects this is so. The cost
increase in this case is 64 per cent, against an increase in the general
price level by 145 per cent.
7. Malankara
Another small hydro-electric (HE) project with an installed capacity
of 10.5 MW and annual generation of 65 MU, this scheme envisages the
construction of a dam toe power station at the Malankara dam of the
Muvattupuzha valley irrigation project (under construction by the State
PWD). The project will utilise the tail water releases from the
Moolamattom power house of Idukki  hydroelectric project together with
the inflow from 153 square km. free catchment less the irrigation
requirements.
Started in 1987 and expected to generate power by 1990, this
project has by now (1999-2000) registered a time overrun of about 9
years; its capital cost was revised over the period  from Rs. 780 lakhs to
Rs. 43.36 crores by 1997 and then to Rs. 41.13 crores by 1998 and 1999-
2000, thus undergoing a phenomenal increase of 427.3 per cent against
a wholesale price rise of 169 per cent. Reminiscent of the mammoth
inflationary influence of the ‘other factors’ on the capital cost of Kakkad
project, in this case the other factors of sheer waste and overestimation
account for as high an increase as about 258 per cent in the capital cost,
that calls for another careful diagnosis.
8. Chimony
Another mini hydel project, this scheme envisages installation of
a generating unit of 2.5 MW in a dam toe power station at Chimony
irrigation dam (under construction by the State PWD). It is expected
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that 6.5 MU of energy can be economically generated during the period
from December to May.
Started in 1987 and originally scheduled to be commissioned in
1990, this project fell by 1993 a prey to a dispute between the contractor
of the electrical works and the KSEB and all the works were paralysed
thanks to a stay order from the High Court obtained by the contractor.
By 1993, the capital cost was revised from its original level of Rs. 314
lakhs to Rs. 425 lakhs, representing an increase of 35.35 per cent against
a general price rise of 72 per cent over the same period.
9.  Peppara
This small project was proposed to benefit Thiruvananthapuram
city by making use of the drinking water supply released from Peppara
dam (owned by the Kerala Water Authority) through a dam toe power
house of an installed capacity of 3 MW and an annual generation of 11.5
MU.
Again a 1987 project supposed to have the normal gestation period
of 3 years, it was finally commissioned only in 1996, with a time overrun
of 6 years and a cost escalation of 73.7 per cent over the original estimate
of Rs. 392 lakhs, against a general price rise of 118.3 per cent during this
period. Note that the cost estimate was earlier revised to Rs. 850 lakhs in
1995 and then reduced to Rs. 625 lakhs in 1998 only to raise again to Rs.
671 lakhs in 1999 – another apt example for the haphazard planning
mechanism.
10. Poringalkuthu Left Bank Extension
This scheme is to construct a second power station with an installed
capacity of 16 MW and an annual generation of 38 MU for better
utilisation of the water release from the existing scheme (Poringalkuthu
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power house). Its works were started in 1989 and it was expected to be
commissioned in 1992-93. After a time overrun of about 6 years, it was
commissioned in 1999; the original cost estimate of Rs. 902 lakhs rose
by about 374 per cent to reach Rs. 42.7 crores. Comparing this with the
rise in the WPI (all commodities) over the same period by 113 per cent,
about 261 per cent of the increase in the cost estimate is found to be
attributable to ‘other factors’ of wasteful management and over-
estimation.
11. Kuttiyadi Tail Race
This project proposes to utilize the regulated discharge from the
existing Kakkayam power station of Kuttiyadi HE project for power
generation in a station to be located further downstream. The proposed
installed capacity is 2.5 MW and the annual generation 15 MU.
The project was started in 1989, and expected to be commissioned
in 1992-93. By 1999-2000, with a time overrun of 7 years, the estimated
cost rose by 225 per cent from the original Rs. 397 lakhs. The general
price rise during this period was by 132 per cent, indicating an increase
of about 93 per cent in the cost estimate due to ‘other factors’, over and
above the influence of price inflation. Note that the revised estimate in
1997 was Rs. 14.48 crores (265 per cent above the original) and in 1998,
Rs. 13.38 crores!
12. Azhutha Diversion
This scheme envisages diversion of waters from about 16,8389
sq. km. catchment of the upper reaches of Azhutha river, a major tributary
of river Pamba to Idukki reservoir for increasing the power potential of
Idukki power project by 57 MU. The scheme will provide diversion of
about 57.6 mm3  of water on an average per annum.
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The work on this project was started in 1987, anticipating it to be
commissioned in 1991. After a time overrun of about 6 years, it was
partially commissioned in June 1998. By 1999-2000, the original cost
estimate was revised upward from Rs. 290 lakhs to Rs. 14.46 crores, an
increase of nearly 400 per cent, against the rise in the WPI (all
commodities) by 145 per cent. Thus the factors other than price rise
appear to account for about 254 per cent increase in the cost estimate.
13. Kuttiar Diversion
This scheme envisages diversion of waters from a catchment of
10.4 sq. km. of Kuttiyar river (a tributary of Muvattupuzha river) to
Idukki reservoir to raise the power potential of Idukki power project by
36.6 MU.
Started in 1988 with an original cost estimate of Rs. 214 lakhs,
this project was to be completed at the earliest by 1990-91. At present it
is expected to be commissioned in the near future, with a cost escalation
by 343.5 per cent to Rs. 949 lakhs over a time overrun of about 8 years
as in 1999-2000. This is against a general price rise by 132 per cent
during the same period. Thus about 211 per cent increase in the cost
estimate of this project remains to be explained in terms of ‘other factors’.
14. Vadakkeppuzha Diversion
This scheme envisages diversion from 3.43 sq. km. catchment of
Vadakkeppuzha, a tributary of Muvattupuzha river and 0.625 sq. km.
catchment of Pothumattom stream, also of Muvattupuzha basin, to Idukki
reservoir to augment the firm generation of Idukki project by 12.3 MU.
When the project work was started in 1989, it was proposed to be
completed by 1991-92. However, even after a time overrun of 8 years as
in 1999-2000, the commissioning date remains ‘not fixed’, and the
original cost estimate of Rs. 131 lakhs rose by 292  per cent to Rs. 514
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lakhs against a rise in WPI (all commodities) by 132 per cent  over the
same period, leaving 160 per cent increase in the cost estimate to be
accounted for by `other factors’. Note that the cost estimate was revised
upward to Rs. 786 lakhs in 1997-98 and then downward to Rs. 705 lakhs
in the next year only to be drastically cut down again to Rs. 514 lakhs in
1999-2000.
15. Vazhikkadavu Diversion
This scheme envisages diversion of waters from 6 sq. km. of
catchment of Vazhikkadavu to the Idukki Reservoir by a diversion tunnel
to increase the firm power of Idukki project by 24 MU.
Started in 1989, this project was expected to be completed by 1992-
93. However, even after a time overrun of about 7 years as in 1999, it too
remains with an uncertain commissioning date. The original cost estimate
had to be revised by a phenomenal 760 per cent, dwarfing even the
classical Kakkad phenomenon, from Rs. 186 lakhs to Rs. 15.99 crores
against a general price inflation by 132 per cent over the same period.
Thus an increase to the tune of about 628 per cent in the cost estimate
remains as due to the influence of ‘other factors’ – a shocking example
of mismanagement in the preparation of project proposal and cost
estimation, that too in the case of only a diversion project, meant to
increase water availability only.
16. Kuttiady Extension
The storage capacity of the existing Kuttiady reservoir being highly
inadequate, full utilisation of the inflow is not possible now. Hence, under
this extension scheme, capacity addition (one unit of 50 MW; 75 MU) to
the existing power station is proposed.  Though the project was cleared
by the Planning Commission in January 1992, major works on it started
only in February 1994, and it was originally expected to be commissioned
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in 1995-96. After a time over-run of 4 years, it was finally commissioned
in 2000, with a cost overrun of 544 per cent over the original estimate of
Rs. 30.73 crores (that went to Rs. 198 crores), against a general price
inflation of just 73 per cent, leaving an unbelievable waste gap of  471
per cent!
3.    A  Comparative Analysis
As already explained, the estimation of the capital cost of a project
is made based on the price level prevailing at the time when the project
proposal is made; and hence there is a time-element of error involved in
it representing under-estimation in the face of inflation. Cost estimate is
often revised upwards to take account of this, especially when the price
level is rising rapidly and/or the time-overrun involves an element of
uncertainty as to the completion of the project. Ideally, a revised cost
estimate should sufficiently cover the general price rise.  And hence
what remains in the revised cost escalation of a project over and above
the general price inflationary influences is a matter for serious
consideration; it may represent an over-estimation due to uncertainty or
an element of deliberate attempt at wasteful mismanagement of resources.
Of the 20 projects we have considered above, barring 7 projects,
all others have significantly very high remainder in their revised cost
estimates in excess of the general inflationary impact (Table 2). The 7
projects are Idukki II, Idamalayar, Kallada, Malampuzha, Madupetty,
Chimony, and Peppara. In the case of Chimony project, the work of
which had to be suspended due to a dispute with the contractor that
brought in  Court intervention, the inadequate coverage of the general
price inflation in the revised cost estimate might be a case of under-
estimation. In the case of a number of projects (for example, Kakkad,
almost all the mini projects and some of the diversion projects), the cost
estimates have been revised every year in a very haphazard manner,
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some time upward and then downward, indicating an inconsistent
planning mechanism.
It should be noted that apart from the ‘Classical’ case of Kakkad
project, it is the mini hydel projects and diversion schemes that have
become comparatively more prone to time and cost overrun. The
mammoth cost escalations in the case of Malankara mini HE project and
Vazhikkadavu diversion are a phenomenal swell in some element of error
that has crept in the project design and estimation. The other things appear
to have influential sway over most of the other projects also.
In general, these 20 projects of the last 3 decades account for time
overruns ranging between 62.5 per cent (Kallada) and 500 per cent
(Malampuzha) of the expected period of construction, and  cost overruns
ranging between 52.7 per cent (Kallada) and 777 per cent (Sabarigiri
Augmentation), of the original cost estimate (excluding Chimony).
For a more objective comparison, we can analyse the capital cost
per kWh of potential energy of these projects (Table 2). Among the power
plants considered, the capital cost per unit of electricity was the lowest
for Idukki II Stage with 68 Paise per unit and among the augmentation
schemes, for Idukki III Stage with only 40 Paise per unit. The highest
cost escalation of Sabarigiri augmentation project has spread very thinly
over the large units of its energy potential, resulting in a capital cost of
only 90 Paise per unit. Idamalayar stands with a capital cost of Rs. 2.81
per kWh of energy. On the other extreme, one’s common sense may be
baffled at the mammoth capital cost of Rs. 26.4 per unit as per the latest
estimate in the case of Kuttiady extension project. Energy from the still
unborn Pooyankutty project too is priced out very high at Rs. 12.7 per
unit!  Malampuzha (Rs. 12.1 per unit) and Kuttiady Tail Race (Rs. 8.6
per unit) are also planned to be high cost energy generators. Note that
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the capital cost of energy from Kakkad, the classical example for time
and cost over-run, is Rs. 5.9 per unit.
It will be enlightening to compare these figures with the original
capital cost of Enron project (Dabhol power project phase I) in
Maharashtra much criticised as ushering in an era of stupendously high-
cost energy in India. Its original capital cost of Rs. 4.48 crores per MW
of capacity at the normal load factor of 68.5 per cent implies a unit capital
cost of Rs. 7.5 per kWh. The Kuttiady extension project undertaken with
a Canadian loan and contracted for its completion with a Canadian firm
(SNC Lavalin) involves a capital cost, which is about 3.5 times the
controversial original cost of the Enron project! It should be remembered
that Enron’s was a new project, while only an extension work was done
at Kuttiady. It is highly significant to note that the Kuttiady extension
work contract was awarded to the Canadian firm by a leftist government
in the State that is credited with an assertive anathema against foreign
capital, especially the Enron, but has time and again stood in defence of
the Canadian firm, sanctioning all their demands of time and cost over-
runs. Now compare the other projects also.
4.    The Cost of Delays
The delay in commissioning a power project invariably involves
different elements of avoidable costs to the society. The most immediate
one is the cost escalation itself. A direct cost of over-runs is in terms of
the additional energy realisable, were the project commissioned in time,
as well as the additional sales revenue thereof. The increased availability
of power could reduce the requirement of costly energy import, thus
effecting some cost savings in it. In addition to these is the indirect cost
of unsatisfied demand corresponding to the additional energy realisable.
In this section we make an attempt to quantify  the cost of time
over-runs of the projects under study in terms of additional energy and
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revenue that could be realised if these projects were commissioned in
time. The results are shown in Table 3.
We start with the year 1983-84, by which time, it is assumed, the
four earlier projects, Idukki II and III Stages, Idamalayar, and Sabarigiri
Augmentation could be brought on line, so that the available firm
generation capacity in 1983-84 would be 5554 MU, instead of the actual
3726 MU. Given the firm power capacity utilisation (98 per cent)  and
loss (26 per cent) structure in the system, this then yields additional
generation  of 1788 MU and additional sales of 1327 MU, which at an
average rate of 35.2 Paise per unit would realise an additional revenue
of Rs. 46.7 crores in that year.  Additional revenue obtainable in
1984-85 comes out at Rs. 53.8 crores. The total revenue thus realisable
during these 17  years  from  1983-84  to  1999-2000  is  estimated  at
Rs. 886.3 crores, or Rs. 52 crores per year! This then represents one cost
of avoidable time over-runs of these 19 projects (excluding the non-
starter Pooyankutty  project) in Kerala (Table 3). It is very distressing to
think of such a situation that the cash-strapped KSEB has been forced to
forego a revenue of about Rs. 52 crores a year on average due to delays
in getting the on-going projects commissioned in time.
Such additional generation that could be effected through timely
completion of projects could reduce to a good extent the costly
dependence on energy imports.
Timely completion of these projects could avoid the substantial
burden of capital cost escalation also (Table 4). Such savings factor
highlights the fact that when capital cost is escalated more than what is
planned, it results in a loss of its alternative uses. Considering the
resources constraint of the Government, if these resources were used
more efficiently, then the resultant increased availability of these
resources to the Government could be used for taking up more projects.
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To the extent that such actual cost escalation reflects inefficient resources
utilisation, the savings in capital cost, that ould have been obtained in
the absence of cost overruns, also represents a capital waste involved.
For example, suppose that Kakkad hydro-electric project could be
commissioned in time in 1986 itself, 8 years after its construction works
started. Accounting for the general price inflation during this period, the
capital cost of this project by 1986 would be at the most only Rs. 39.66
crores, saving as much as Rs. 113.86 crores, almost enough to construct
3 more similar plants, or to add to the system capacity by another 140
MW at the nominal cost of Kakkad project! Thus the capital waste
involved in this case is equivalent to 3 more similar plants (Table 4) or
an installed capacity of 140 MW! Timely completion of lower Periyar
project could save as much as Rs. 189 crores, enough for a similar project
of more than 200 MW capacity! The second highest savings, after Lower
Periyar project, could come from Kuttiady extension project to the tune
of Rs. 158.3 crores, almost enough for four similar or Kakkad-type
projects! As already noted, Kallada project (the only exception), even
with 5 years over-run, has not eaten up resources beyond the limits set
by general price inflation.  Timely completion of all other 18 projects
(excluding the non-starter Pooyankutty) could yield a mammoth saving
in capital cost of Rs. 644.03 crores, almost enough for 16 Kakkad-type
projects with 800 MW capacity! Since so much capital resources have
gone wasted, this 800 MW (or Rs. 644 crores) represents the capital
waste involved in the faulty planning and implementation of power
projects in Kerala. That is, the capital waste factor involved is 16 (i.e.,
16 Kakkad-type projects)! And the KSEB still reeling down in the red,
the government lets such waste and mismanagement pass.
It is in this light then that we should examine the so called financial
‘inability’ of the SEBs (and the governments) to finance power
development in general. The basic argument put up in defence of inviting
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private sector participation in power development has come out of the
resources crunch experienced by the governments. However, this defence
is turned out to be flimsy in the face of the fact that there is over
capitalisation in actual practice in the case of each project the government
has undertaken; the government could, through efficient performance,
save substantial resources, which could in turn be used for taking up
additional projects. Behind this inability works the political economy of
corruption.
The gravity of the problem of over-runs can be gauged by
considering the combined effect of both the time and cost over-runs, a
measure of which, called ‘capital x time waste factor’ (also see Morris
1990), is obtained as the difference between the actual capital x time
(CaTa) and the originally planned capital x time (CoTo) measures as a
percentage of the latter (where Ca and Co are the actual (or latest) and
originally planned estimates of capital cost and Ta and To are the
corresponding period of commissioning). In estimating this resources
waste factor, we assume that expenditure over the course of a project
takes place uniformly. Thus in the case of the Kakkad project, the
originally planned resources were Rs. 18.6 crores x 10 years = Rs. 186
crore years, but the actual resources spent were Rs. 153.52 crores x 23
years = Rs. 3530.96 crore years, such that there was a capital x time
waste of Rs. 3344. 96 crore years or 1798.4 per cent of the originally
planned resources. Thus it shows that as a result of time and cost overruns,
this project has eaten up about 1800 per cent more capital x time than
what was originally expected. In other words, if the Kakkad project could
be completed on time as per plans, then the KSEB could increase the
quantum of similar projects by about 1800 per cent with the same
resources it actually spent for a single project.
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The capital x time waste factor for the 19 projects (excluding the
non-starter Pooyankutty) ranges from 148 per cent for Kallada project
to 2766 per cent for Vazhikkadavu diversion! (Table 4). There are as
many as 9 projects (6 of which are mini or diversion projects) having
more than 1000 per cent waste factor. That on average, each project has
eaten up extra resources worth 1100 per cent just shows in general the
enormous waste of capital x time resources in power project
implementation in Kerala.
Kuttiady power project had been out of service for a long time
now in the name of extension works going on there. The extension
programme with a time over-run of more than four years and a
stupendously exorbitant capital cost of Rs. 26.4 per kWh of energy
potential, also involved substantial revenue loss for the parent project
due to its closure. The firm generation potential of Kuttiady power station
is about 270 MU or 0.74 MU a day, equivalent to a sales revenue of
about Rs. 15 lakhs a day. If the extension scheme were commissioned in
time (i.e., in 1995-96), it could fetch sales revenue of about Rs. 7.1 lakhs
a day. During the last 5 years, the total loss of sales revenue alone comes
out to be Rs. 399 crores in this case!
5.    Causes  of  Delays
A host of causatives are at work behind the delays – changes in the
technical design and feasibility reports, original cost estimates being
based on inadequate or incomplete data and unrealistic assumptions,
inefficient management, inadequate geological and technical
investigations of the projects at the outset, vague and ambiguous
specifications and conditions of contract, sluggish decision making at
various stages of construction, lack of availability of materials or of
transportation facilities, infighting and ego clashes among different
groups of the bureaucracy and technocracy of the KSEB, unwarranted
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transfer of planning and supervisory staff between projects during their
construction, a lack of vision about the power needs of the State, labour
Causes of Delays
 The principal causes of delays in the case of hydro-
power plants, inter alia, have been listed by the Committee
on Shortfall in Generation During the Third Five Year Plan
under the Chairmanship of Sri. K. P. S. Nair as follows:
1. Inadequate investigation before finalising technical
project report.
2. Major change in the scope of work like
(a) change in the location of dam;
(b) change in design of dam foundation;
(c) change in design of Water Conductor System;
(d) change in location of power station and
switch yard;
(e) change in generator capacity.
3. Delay due to inter-State aspects.
4. Delay in issue of authorisation by Central/State
authorities.
5. Delay in foreign exchange tie ups.
6. Change in key personnel in the course of advance
planning and execution.
7. Delay in procurement of equipment due to
(a) late issue and late finalisation of tenders;
(b) procedural delays in processing through
DGS&D;
(c) processing of foreign exchange release by
Government of India (GOI).
8. Delay in procurement of construction equipment.
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9. Shortage of cement and steel, welding rods,
explosives, etc.
10. Shortage of spare parts for construction equipment.
11. Late arrival of erection specialists.
12. Delay in delivery of equipment due to failure of
supplier to keep up schedule;
13. Difficulties in transporting equipment to site
(a) in moving over dimensional packages on railway
due to restrictions imposed by bridges, tunnels, etc.;
(b) due to difficult terrain and lack of proper access
roads.
14.  Unprecedented rains and floods.
15.  Land acquisition and rehabilitation.’
disputes, court  interventions for aggrieved contractors, and so on (Kannan
and Pillai 2001 a). Nurturing all these is a lack of political will to finish
the work on schedule, borne and bred of course by high level corruption
and an indifferent public.
Recurring labour militancy is recognised in general as the single
factor that puts the highest cost burden in this respect. And it cannot be
otherwise in a politically surcharged atmosphere of highly pampered
unionism of diverse hues peculiar to Kerala. Not a single project in Kerala
(including the prestigious major project of Idukki) has been left unhaunted
by the spectre of tools-downing militancy. The construction work of the
Idukki project was much pompously inaugurated by the then chief
minister, EMS Namboothiripad, on 10 February 1966; and the very next
day started a labour strike, that finally culminated in the death  of two
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The Cost of Labour Militancy
There are two distressing examples from the recent history
of power development in Kerala of the damages caused to
the overall power and economic development of the State
by the irrational behaviour of organised militant labour.
The first is the example of Idukki Stage I, a 390 MW
project, which could not be commissioned in the Fourth
Five Year Plan (1969-74) and had a long gestation period
because of frequent strikes and interruptions of work by
labour. This project could be ultimately commissioned only
in 1976. The Electricity Board suffered the consequences
of delays caused in commissioning this project by way of
escalation in costs and revenue foregone as a result of
longer gestation period 8 years ago. At the time Idukki – I
was commissioned in 1976, there were a large number of
consumers in all sectors of the State’s economy waiting
for power connections. Public memory being proverbially
short, people have foregotten the great damage caused to
the economy of the State by the long delay in the
commissioning of Idukki,
We would, however, like to recapitulate a recent experience
of Idamalayar hydro-electric project, which unfortunately
is yet to be commissioned (at the time this report is being
got ready) because of unreasonable and irrational labour
militancy. ……………
The strike by the employees in this project started within
three months of the commencement of work on the
construction of the dam. The first strike was on 8-12-1976.
There were a number of strikes between 8-12-1976 and
 5-9-1979 by employees working in dam construction, but
these strikes were settled without much loss of time. But
27
there was a long strike which increased the gestation period
of the project by 6 months and 15 days (excluding monsoon
off) which commenced on 6-6-1979 (ninth month of
construction) and ended only on 25-3-1980. The direct
financial loss on this account is estimated to Rs. 125 lakhs
and it has also escalated the cost of the  project  by
Rs. 142.5 lakhs.
During the period between 7-5-1977 and 18-1- 1983, there
were a number of strikes in the power house resulting in a
total financial loss of Rs. 15 lakhs.
The two strikes in the tunnel work of this project were
something unique perhaps without parallel in the history
of power development anywhere in the world. Initially
the employees engaged in the tunnel work struck work
between 9-6-1980 and 20-11-1980 increasing the gestation
period by 5 months. But the most crucial strike which
affected the project and postponed its commissioning was
started on 10-4-1981 and continued till 10-6-1983 thereby
postponing the completion of the project by 2 years and 2
months. The employees involved in the strike were only
110. The financial commitment for settling the strike was
about Rs. 125 lakhs…………..
The major issue causing this strike was the demand by the
contractor’s employees engaged in this project for an
assurance that they would be absorbed as permanent
employees of the Electricity Board. We understand that a
number of these workers were working as contractor’s
labour in earlier hydro-electric projects in Idukki and
elsewhere. But we cannot appreciate how this would give
any moral or legal rights to these employees to claim
permanent employment in the Electricity Board.
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It is difficult to quantify the losses to the community due
to the 3 strikes (one in the dam construction and two in
the tunnel work) extending over a total period of three
years and one month. Cosidering that the total installed
capacity of the hydro system in Kerala is only 1011.5 MW
an addition of 75 MW three years earlier would have
cushioned to some extent the power famine in Kerala
especially in the year 1982-83. The losses to the Electricity
Board as a result of the strike during dam construction
has been estimated to be Rs. 267.5 lakhs. The losses due
to the delay in completing the tunnel is estimated to be
Rs. 30.98 crores out of which Rs. 29.31 crores is loss of
revenue due to delay in commissioning of the project and
Rs. 1.67 crores is due to escalation in costs and revision
of schedules. The total loss incurred by the project as a
result of the delay of three years and one month (1125
days) is Rs. 33.65 crores. The loss per day of delay works
out to slightly less than Rs. 3 lakhs. This state of affairs
did not stir the conscience of the people of Kerala who
remained apathetic. A project being delayed for such a
long time and every day’s delay costing Rs. 3 lakhs to the
taxpayer did not receive adequate publicity in the Press or
political platforms. That this could happen in a State with
a vigilant press and politically conscious people is a
tragedy.
We feel that an in-depth study by one of the all India
management institutions into this strike, especially how
and why it was allowed to continue for over three years
and how and why the public opinion in the most literate
State of the Country was silent, would be very useful to
draw appropriate lessons for the future.
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We strongly recommend issuing an ordinance followed
by enactment of appropriate legislation prohibiting strikes
under any circumstances in all power projects under
construction. …….Those who take part in such strikes and
their leaders should get a minimum punishment of
compulsory imprisonment for a specific period prescribed
in such a law. In addition, all those who participate in such
strikes should be debarred from being eligible for
appointments under Government or any other institution
owned or controlled by Government. ……..
- Government of Kerala 1984: 57-61.
workers  in police firing! It might be a cruel irony that the project
(Stage I)  could be completed and commissioned only under the coercive
‘normality’ during the infamous period of national emergency!
 Idamalayar project was one of the most unfortunate victims of
recurring and long-inertial periods of labour unrest. Some stories, as
told in the Report of the High Level Committee (1984) of Government
of Kerala, are given in the box  above.
Kakkad project had a long tale of unending woes of corruption
and trade union militancy. When construction works started, serious
defects in design were found out. Initially the whole construction works
were awarded to one contractor who had no pre-qualification but was
preferred by the then concerned minister. The contractor was too
inexperienced and inefficient to yield any progress in works for quite a
long time, and the KSEB was forced to terminate the contract in June
1981and select fresh ones. The construction works on the interconnecting
tunnel was started in 1980 at an estimated cost of Rs. 5.59 crores. Soon
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the workers went on strike, as the contractor refused to pay the ruling
wage rate. In June 1981, another company was entrusted with the work,
but still there was no progress; hence the work was divided and given to
The Kakkad Saga of Leakages
The Kakkad hydroelectric project of 50 MW, that took
more than 20 years for completion, has been under the
jinx on a number of fronts - excessive time and cost
overruns and faulty planning and construction. One of the
most infamous example in this connection was the costly
effect of an engineering defect in the power tunnel
construction that went on from the two opposite sides (with
the good intention of expediting the work), but never
meeting together. The two tunnels dug from opposite sides
just went in parallel!
Leakages in the power tunnel has been another recurrent
problem. A major leak was detected in the concrete lining
of the tunnel gate at Adit-5 of this 13 km-long power tunnel
just two months prior to the commissioning of the project
in 1999. The KSEB had to spend Rs. 15 lakhs to repair the
damaged portion using Epoxy mixture (The Hindu daily,
2 September 2001). And very recently, the project had to
be shut down (on August 28, 2001) following the detection
of a major leak through the same Adit-5. There are reports
of widespread allegations of a corrupt nexus between
certain KSEB quarters and the contractor lobby, attempting
to create more and more work avenues in one or another
way (ibid.). What is missing in general, however, is an
expected social concern over the security of the tunnel
and the dangerous consequences. And it must be so in an
environment vicious of the political economy of rent
seeking and the public indifference to it.
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three contractors on  condition that the work should be completed within
41 months, and the cost went up to Rs. 11 crores. In due course, three
more contractors joined, yet by March 1988, only 30 per cent of the
work could be completed! Rightly, it was also a situation where too
many cooks were spoiling the broth. Reports show that in all there were
16 contractors entrusted with the work in different phases (The New
Indian Express, June 20, 2001).
The tortoise continued its pace, but not on any race. Interrupted
very often by agitations, the tunnel construction went on and on from
two opposite sides, but it never met together; the two tunnels from
opposite sides just ran in parallel! An excellent engineering feat!
 Finally after 21.5 years, the tortoise reached its destination, eating
away more than Rs. 150 crores.
The World Bank aided Lower Periyar project, visualised in the
1970s and cleared by the Planning Commission in 1983, also tells almost
the same story of delays. The public sector National Power Construction
Corporation (NPCC), that took up the civil works, just wasted more
than 4 years without any progress. Finally this contract was terminated
in 1993 in an out-of-court settlement and the private sector Hindustan
Construction Corporation (HCC) entered the scene. The same company
(HCC) had taken up the tunnel works (in February 1984), with the
deadline set on 26 October 1989. Later on HCC requested for time
extension citing reasons as beyond their control, and the deadline was
extended to 30 June 1992. Just one month prior to this date, HCC
submitted to the KSEB a memorandum giving details of delays as follows
– initial troubles: 5 months; labour problems: 10 months and 29 days;
climatical problems: 10 months and 6 days; and obstructions/impediments
on the part of the KSEB: 15 months! The company demanded for an
additional payment of Rs. 16.33 crores to cover the increased costs due
32
The Lower Periyar Ecological Jinx
The Lower Periyar power project involves some serious
long-run fallout on environment not considered properly.
The project causes a 15 km break in the course of the
Periyar river, at least during summer, as it is diverted
through the tunnel from Pambla to Karimanal, the power
station site. The river, already tamed considerably by the
Idukki project, thus ‘dies’ at Pambla and ‘resurrects’ at
Karimanal, where the tail-race water from the power
station gives life back to the river!
to this time over-run. They had already been allowed a cost increase of
about Rs. 61.8 crores, against  the original estimate of Rs. 23 crores. A
committee, constituted to look into the fresh demand, recommended,
surprisingly, a payment of Rs. 8.5 crores with an immediate disbursement
of Rs. 2.5 crores to HCC. The alleged bias towards HCC of the committee,
that never cared for the loss to the KSEB amounting to Rs. 117 crores
due to the 47 months time over-run, made headlines in the media and the
clamour echoed in the legislative assembly for days. The company moved
the High Court and the matter went up to the Supreme Court; finally the
KSEB had to eat its heart out! It should be added that the World Bank,
that had given aid to the project initially, but got reportedly frustrated
over the time and cost over-runs, backed out long back.
On Inefficiency, Again!
Anyone familiar with the history of the Lower Periyar
project can narrate any number of instances of the KSEB’s
inefficiency and lack of seriousness in getting the job done
on time. For instance, when the steel rope of the surge
shaft’s gate snapped a few months [before its due date of
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commissioning], it took close to two months for the Board
to retrieve the equipment from the power shaft’s well and
to replace the rope. This could have been done in a few
days, had the Board acted promptly.
Instead of retrieving the equipment and thus speeding up
the commissioning, the Board’s attention was focussed
on fixing the responsibility for the disaster and find
scapegoats….According to a rough estimate, the loss of a
day’s power generation at Lower Periyar was Rs. 14 lakhs.
Any responsible authority would have fixed the generating
system first, and fixed the responsibility later……
One of the main impediments to the project becoming fully
functional is said to be the delay in the arrival of the hoists
of the five radial gates of the dam at Pampla. The
Allahabad-based Thriveni Structurals, a public sector
undertaking, was given the order for these equipment long
back, in 1988. It failed several times to honour the
commitment. Insiders allege that the KSEB miserably
failed in forcing Thriveni to stick to its schedule or find
alternatives [in time].
-The Hindu, 23 October 1997.
Another jinxed project is Malampuzha, one of the first projects
planned in the State to generate electricity from water let out from an
irrigation dam. The contract for the design, supply and installation works
were awarded to a private firm which allegedly had no previous
experience in such projects. The civil work was done by the KSEB.
Though the company started the erection work in 1992, it took as
many as four years to attempt at a trial run. However, during the trial
run, some defects were noticed in the butterfly valve. In 1997, another
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trial run was tried, but again during the run, a valve disc got broken. And
the story still continues…..
Chimony, locked in a High Court stay obtained by the contractor
since 1993, on the other hand, is altogether left out from the KSEB reports
now!
It is significant to note in this respect that the KSEB used to present,
in its Annual Administration Report, a detailed status report on the
progress of each project, which, however, has been missing for quite
some time now. Absence of such transparency makes difficult any
examination on the causes of delay.
It should not, however, be construed that every power project in
Kerala necessarily falls under the jinx of delay. The NTPC thermal project
at Kayamkulam could be completed and test fired on 1 November 1998,
four months ahead of the schedule. Similarly, the first private sector
hydroelectric plant at Maniyar (12 MW) could be completed and
commissioned within 15 months in 1994, by the Carborandom Universal
Company. In this light, it goes without saying that something is rotten
behind the KSEB projects – and it is nothing but the dead political will,
dead of corrupt politicians and indifferent public.
6.   The Political Economy of Corruption
A detailed discussion of this aspect is provided in Kannan and
Pillai (2001 b); below we sketch out the most relevant ones.
In a neo-classical representation of political process, the
relationships among the public, government and utility may be aptly
analysed in the light of a three-tier hierarchical model of principal-agent
problem. The problem consists in the default and breach of trust
(i.e., moral hazard and adverse selection, Arrow 1985), likely on account
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of the conflicting objectives of self-interest maximisation of the concerned
parties and the uncertainty or information asymmetry involved in the
relationship. In its simple version, it is assumed that in a regulatory
governance structure, the principal’s (i.e., the public’s) objective is to
maximise some measure of social welfare, while the agent (the
government as supervisor) and the sub-agent (utility) aim to maximise
the returns of their respective rent seeking pursuits. In a complex structure
of relationships, the principal may be viewed as a composite set of
sectional interests against the background of the general welfare objective;
each class in this composite set, such as the contractors, construction
workers, bureaucracy, politicians and others, follows its own designs of
predatory rent seeking that dominate, in a particular context, the common
objective. Such a structuring facilitates to analyse the political economy
of corruption involved in the time and cost overruns in the power projects
in Kerala.
Apart from the usual ‘sales’ procedures of construction contracts
and materials purchase orders carried out by means of a collusion between
the supervisor (government) and the sub-agent (bureaucracy in the utility),
favouring certain contractors, the practice of allowing for time overruns
of projects and sanctioning the associated cost escalations involves a
‘wide spectrum collusion’ among the domineering class interests in the
composite principal set, viz., the political party in power
(i.e., government), bureaucracy, contractors and trade unions. As already
highlighted, recurring unrestricted labour militancy is recognised in
general as the single factor that puts the heaviest burden on the pace of
the construction works of power projects in Kerala, largely dictated by
party-political rivalry rather than genuine labour demands, as for example,
in the construction of Idukki hydro-electric project, to begin with. The
time overruns out of the striking militancy upon one or another pecuniary
pretext essentially go into the contractors’ demand for cost escalation,
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that is soon endorsed by the Board and sanctioned by the government.1
Such rent-sharing is a widely recognised official practice in the power-
irrigation sectors. The glaring laxity on the part of the government in
fulfilling its committed responsibility for enforcing its authority on the
contractors and workers to bind them within the contractual terms they
agreed to take up to honour is a clear indication of its corrupt collusion.
As mentioned above, in Kerala, the time and cost overruns have afflicted
only the State power projects; the public sector NTPC thermal and the
private sector hydro projects in the State having been completed well
within their scheduled times. In this light, then, the cost escalation
sanctioned for each late-run project may rightly be taken to represent
the cost of corruption involved in construction contract sales in the power
sector of the State. Accounting for the general price inflation during the
normal construction period, this amounts to Rs. 644 crores or Rs. 35.8
crores per project!  Unbelievably, it represents on an average about 60
per cent of the actual project cost! In some cases it is well above 70 per
cent; for example, Sabarigiri Augmentation (75 per cent), Kakkad (74
per cent), Malankara (76 per cent), Poringalkuthu left bank extension
(71 per cent), Kuttiady extension (80 per cent) and the diversion projects
of Azutha (71 per cent), Kuttiar (73 per cent) and Vazhikkadavu (84 per
cent). This is all shared among the four parties involved, at the cost of
the helpless majority in the ‘principal’ set of tax payers.
Such lucrative rent sharing collusion has unfortunately become
firmly institutionalised in the political process of the country. A highly
individualistic self-interest domineering ethos have come to stay across
1 Excluding  the hydro projects of Kallada and Pooyankutty, and the two diesel
power plants. If we stick to the strict assumption that the original project cost
estimate allow for possible inflation during construction period, such that the
estimate be as on the completion date, then the corruption charges involved would
be very much higher.
37
the social texture only to strengthen this political economy of corruption.
It is not that the principal, the public at large, is unaware of all these
murky dealings and developments; but they largely remain apathetic,
even after enlightened enough in one or another way by the Press, true
to the rotten spirit of an individualistic utilitarian society, lying moribund
but never dying. This in fact questions at least to some extent the validity
of the neo-classical apology of imperfect information as leading to the
principal-agent problem. What is at heart of the malady is a lack of a
sense of oneness, resulting in the void of an effective platform of checks
and balances, that would have avoided problems arising from moral
hazards and adverse selection. And this should point towards the
significance of a soul-cleansing cultural revolution, reminiscent of that
of the era of liberalism.
This may, however, appear a highly idealistic long-term objective.
We do recognise the exertion of significant public praxis by a few
concerned citizens and their organisations for immediate, palliative
results. Strengthening and extending such praxis can go a long way
towards imposing the public will for common interests on the political
process. For example, there are measures that can effectively be applied
to restrain time and cost overruns in the public projects: the construction
contracts be so structured as to provide for making the contractors liable
for stringent penalties in case of non-performance such as time overrun.
The previous LDF state government (1996-2001) was reported to have
made some steps in this direction in the case of the Athirappally
hydroelectric project by initiating to institute in the contract penalty
provisions for delay - something of the first kind in the history of the
KSEB, if implemented. And it is such ifs that govern the direction and
tempo of our development.
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